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Abstract 
Th is paper investigates the theoretical relationship between economic reforms and inequalities in 
socialist countries and tests it empirically in the c訟e of China. The paper argues 出at the issue of 
whether market oriented reforms are likely to increase or decrease inequality in the former socialist 
economies is an empirical question which cannot be settled by a priori reasoning. On the one hand , 
economic inequality may rise with the reintroduction of property income and incentive payments and 
the reduction of barriers to opportunity for labor and capital to 臼lly realize their highest earning 
potentials , On the other hand , inequality may dec1 ine with the decentralization of property rights , 
information and the reduction of barriers to the movement of goods and productive factors. The 
Chinese experience shows that economic inequalities did not increase but dec1 ine slightly during the 
first stage of the reforms. But they rose during the second stage of the reforms. Hence , the Chinese 
experience is largely congruent with the Szelenyi- Manchin hypothesis. 
Socialism has many definitions but one feature all agree on is that it attempts to ensure the 
benefits of economic growth are distributed equitably. To the extent that market-oriented reforms are 
accompanied by increasing, inequality 出ey become less compatible with socialism. Hence the 
survival of China's socialism in future depends on the critical relationship between economic reforms 
and inequality. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine (a) the trends of inequality and stratification in China 
under the reforms and (b) to find out whether or not there is a correlation between the reforms and 
inequality in 也at country. 
The paper is divid叫 into several sections. The first surveys the Iiterature in respect to the 
theories explaining the Iink between economic reforms and inequality. Section 11 presents a statistical 
analysis of income inequality during the reform period. Section 111 explores the sources of income 
inequality. Section IV examines other aspects of economic inequality and Section V takes a closer 
look at the rural poor. The paper concludes wi出 a summary of the findings and some comments on 
inequality in China in the near future. 
Market-oriented Reform and Inequality 
Despite its significance for the survival of socialism theoretical investigations into 出e
relationship between reforms and inequality in socialist countries are few. Most studies are empirical 
ones , the most notable of which are those of Flakierski, Whyte, Walder, Nolan , Griffin and Chai. 
Among , the few theoretical attempts to explain the nature of this relationship we can 
distinguish three schools of 出ought; namely. (1) the classical school , (2) the neo-liberal school , and 
(3) the barrier approach. 
The classical school holds that reforms are likely to result in increasing , economic inequality 
because of (1) the reintroduction of property income, (2) the reintroduction of incentive payments , 
and (3) the widening of wage differentials. 
A useful approach to analyze income inequality is to treat personal income ωcomposed of 
two parts , namely wage and property income. Hence the variation of personal income depends on 
the following , factors: (1) The relative shares of wage and property income, (2) the wage and 
property income di旺'erentials , and (3) the correlation of the distribution of these two types of income 
between individuals. 1 
By definition property income in a socialist economy is absent or negligible. Th is is true even 
if one considers real income or income in kind , since the property income in the form of surplus 
produced by capital assets is siphoned 0旺 by the state and redistributed more or less on an egalitarian 
basis to individuals either in the form of transfer payments or public consumer goods. Hence, the 
variation of property income in a socialist society , whether nominal or real , is likely to be very 
limited. 
Similarly, it can reasonably be conjectured 出at the correlation between labor and property 
income in a socia1 ist society is likely to be nonexistent. In contrast to capitalist countries the variation 
of income in a socialist society is further reduced by the relatively small variation of wage income 
due to the ideological commitment to equality. Hence, one would in general expect the inequality 
of income to be less in socialist countries than in capitalist ones. 
Economic reforms involve the decentralization of property rights and a change in the 
preference structure of the politicalleadership. The former allows individuals to own capital assets 
and to earn property income. Since property income is less equally distributed than wage income 
reforms are expected to aggravate overall income inequa1 ity. In order to maximize surplus and 
labor supply as well as productivity the politica1 leadership must to some degree be willing , to 
compromise equality for the sake of growth. Individual achievement motivation must be stimulated 
through better rewards , e.g. incentive pay and 1紅ger wage differentials. Since the wage income is 
more important in tota1 persona1 income 出an property income a greater variation of wage income is 
seen by the c1assical school as the major contributing , factor towards increased income inequa1 ity 
under economic reforms. 
The neo-liberal school , represented by Szelenyi, Whyte and Nee see control rights as an 
equa11y important variable as monet紅y income contributing to inequa1 ity. Therefore，出eyar息時也at
income distribution in socia1 ist countries is unequa1, especially when there is a high concentration of 
control rights. The greater equality of monetary income in socialist countries is merely an illusion 
for real income is hidden in highly centralized economies through the existence of prerequisites and 
other valuable privileges accompanying power. 
According , to Szelenyi property income in a socialist society is centralized in the state budget 
and redistributed by the state in the form of income in kind and subsidies. However, state 
redistributors as a c1ass are 'selfish' and 'favour' their own kind. Hence property income is mainly 
distributed to the already privileged and/or in power as evident from the higher non-wage 
compensation for the 'redistributive' c1 ass , such as housing" access to better education and medical 
facilities as well as subsidies which are only partially reflected in wage income. 
Economic reforms of socialist systems inevitably require the decentralization of property 
rights. Th is , together with the shift from bureaucratic to market allocation of goods and factors , 
reduces the power and control rights of the state bureaucrats. Hence, neo-liberals hold 出at reforms 
lead to a more equal distribution of the control and income rights of capital assets , and thereby 
decrease income inequal ity. 
While the consideration of control rights is important, the neo-liberal approach suffers severa1 
major analytical weaknesses. Firstly , it focuses primarily on the distribution of income between two 
social c1asses only, namely the state bureaucrats and the immediate producers. Therefore it is 
essentially a macro-theory of income distribution but as such it yields litt1e insight into the size 
distribution of income within these two groups. 
Secondly , it is a static approach and does not take into account the effect of individua1 
capital accumulation on property income. When this is permitted the variation of initial income 
among individuals is likely to lead to a variation of savings and capital accumulation and fina11y to 
increased variation in property holdings and income. Even if one were to start from a completely 
equa1 distribution of property and income and assume 0叫y a stochastic distribution of luck and 出at
the rate of accumulation was proportional to property endowment, these assumptions would suffice 
to generate an unequal distribution of income in a market economy (Adelman and Robinson , p. 972). 
Szelenyi and Manchin (1 986) later develop a more dynamic model and modify their 
proposition. Th is argues 出at after initial equalizing e叮叮ts of the market-oriented reforms , the 
market creates its own inequalities. In the long-run these reinforce those generated by the 
redistributive economy which leads to rising , social stratification as a result of reforms. 
While this revision improves the model it stillleaves a major weakness in the approach. For 
in view of the fact 出at wage income normall y accounts for three quarters of all income the neo-liberal 
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school underestimates the disequalizing , e前'ects of the widening wage differential and of the 
re-introduction of incentive pay. 
The barrier approach argues that even in social ist societies there are some forms of market 
allocation of goods and factors prior to reforms. These markets are seriously limited and frowned 
upon by governments. Economic reforms basically entail the dismantlinbg of these market barriers 
and the shift from highly restricted to perfect markets of bo出 goods and production factors. 
Therefore an analysis of the distributive implications of reforms in a socialist system is not complete 
without considering the ramifications of the reduction of these barriers. The reduction of market 
barriers can either increase or decreases inequality of personal income depending, on the particular 
p訂ameters of the socio-economic system (pryor , 1973 , pp. 392-6). 
1n a socialist economy there is a large variety of institutional barriers , n剖nely (1) barriers to 
the movement of goods and factors of production which result from ideological biases against the 
market; (2) barriers to the flow and use of information which are due to the high degree of 
centralization of information; and (3) barriers to opportunities which resu1t in a less than optimal 
match of individuals and positions due to pe位y requirements , such as membership in the Communist 
party, a proper family background etc .. 
Barriers to information and the movement of goods and factors of production keep them from 
moving to areas where they fetch the highest price and cause wide dispersions of prices for particular 
goods or factors over the economy. Hence, they result in relatively greater inequality. The 
neo-classical general equilibrium analysis predicts 出at a reduction of these barriers reduces the 
difference in factor prices between regions , industries , firms and individuals , and , hence, decreases 
the variation of total income. 
U nlike the latter the barrier to opportunities for labor and 1 capital forestall a meritocracy and 
thereby serve to decrease inequality. Economic reforms lift these barriers and allow labor and capital 
to pursue their optimal allocation and highest productivity and income, and , hence, are likely to 
generate wider dispersion of pay and greater income inequality. 
The conclusion from the discussion of theories is that the impacts of reforms on income 
distribution are diverse and depend on specific societal conditions. A priori reasoning tends to 
simplify issues and it does not explain the diverse impacts sufficiently. On the one hand , economic 
inequality may rise with the re-introduction of property income, incentive payment and the reduction 
of barriers to opportunity for labor and capital to fully realize their highest earning potentials, as well 
as the deliberate a位empt by the government to widen wage di釘'erentials. On the other hand , 
inequality and stratification may decrease with decentralization of property rights and information; 
and with the reduction of barriers to the movement of goods and factors of production. Hence, the 
net effect of the reforms on inequality and stratification can only be empirically assessed on a case 
by case basis. 
Trends in Income Inequality 
Measures of inequality vary considerably for the same population depending , on the unit of 
analysis , the measure of income and the time period covered. Their selection is often limited by the 
availability of income data. 1n the context of China, the only reliable time-series data 扭曲at of rural 
and urban household income survey data by the State Statistical Bureau (SSB). Hence in the 
following , discussion the unit of analysis is household income and specifically household income per 
capita. The concept of income adopted here is 出at of disposable income adjusted for transfer 
payments and other receipts. The period covered is from 1978 to 199 1. 
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Before we present the result of our statistica1 ana1ysis the limitations of 出e officia1 income 
data should be noted. As a recent survey by a group of Western economists utilizing, Western 
concepts show ( Khan et a1, forthcoming) the SSB makes no a110wance for the rental value of housing , 
and its coverage of income in kind and subsidies is less 出an comprehensive. Hence, the average 
income of urban and rura1 households in China is systematica11y underestimated. However, these 
limitations do not a1ter the relativity of income di前'erentia1 s and do not a旺'ect our conclusions 
significant1y. For our ana1ysis is b訟ed on a consistent set of income data and our primary focus is 
not the exact magnitude of inequa1 ity in China in comparison with other countries but the time trend 
during the 14 ye訂s of reforms. 
Income di釘'erentia1 s within a country are prim缸ily determined by income disparity (1). among 
rural households , (2). among urban households , and (3). between urban and rural households , e.g. 
the urban-rura1 income gap. With respect to 出e fir泣， namely rura1 inequa1 ity ，也e Gini coefficient 
ca1culated by SSB revea1s 出at it h泌 risen significantly during the first phase of the reforms from 
1978 to 1984 ( see Table 1) and 出at the trend has continued unabated in the second phase as well. 
With respect to urban income differentials the Gini coefficient, estimated from the SSB urban 
household income and expenditure survey data, indicates a comparatively smaller dispersion of income 
than in rura1 areas. Moreover, it declined from 1977 onward , with the Gini coefficient fa1 ling from 
0.186 in 1977 to 0.168 in 1984, whereas rural household income dispersion increased. However, 
the trend of narrowing urban income dispersion reversed in 1983 and 出e trend of rising urban income 
inequality since 出en is unmistakable. 
In the first period of reforms the trend in urban-rural income disparity paralleled 出at ofurban 
income differential. For the urban-rural income gap narrowed from 2.36 to 1 in 1977 to 1.70 to 1 
in 1983. Since 1984, however, it widened again. 
So far we have referred to the urban-rura1 income gap of an essentially monetary nature. 
However, the urban-rural real income gap , which includes income in kind , subsidies etc. , may not 
correspond to the nominal one due to the above mentioned underestimation of income in kind and 
subsidies by the SSB survey data (see also Lardy 1984). Provision of the income in kind in China 
heavily favors the urban population. Khan and his colleagues , for example, show that urban 
households received 39 per cent of their disposable income in form of subsidies where訟 rural
households were in fact paying 2 percent of their personal income in the form of net taxes. 
Moreover, these taxes include on1y visible ones. If invisible ones , resu1ting from the low purchase 
prices for agricultura1 products paid by the government purchasing agency are included , the rate of 
farm taxation is likely to be much higher. Thus , according to 出e estimate of Khan et a1 the real 
income gap between urban and rura1 household in 1988 was at least 2 .42 to 1 instead of 2.05 to 1 
但也an et 祉， p. 109). 
Another re的on for the divergence between the rea1 and nomina1 urban-rural income gap lies 
扭曲e di在'erent rates of inf1ation between these two sectors. The trend of urban-rural rea1 income 
di叮叮ential can be inferred from 出at of urban-rura1 real consumption disparity? According to Table 
1 the latter roughly corresponds to the trend of urban-rura1 nominal income gap. For the urban-rural 
real consumption gap narrowed from 2.9 to 1 in 1978 to 2.1 to 1 in 1985. Since 1985, however, 
the growth of the rural real consumption standard has slowed , whereas 出at of urban households has 
accelerated. As a resu1t, the urban- rural real consumption gap has widened again. 
Overall income disparity also depends on the percentage share of the urban population or, 
more accurately, on the share of the non-agricultural population in to叫 population. Given an 
urban-rural income gap migration of the population from the low-income countryside to high-income 
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Table 1: Structure of Income Inequality, 1977 - 1991 
Gini ratios urban-rural share of urban 
urban differential population 
Year rural cities cities & nominal real in O/() 
towns lncome consumption 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1977 0.186 236 
1978 0.212 285 17.9 
1979 277 18.2 
1980 0.234 271 18.9 
1981 0.239 0.161 205 272 18.2 
1982 0.232 0.121 183 251 18.6 
1983 0.246 0.158 170 235 18.8 
1984 0.258 0.168 171 223 19.3 
1985 0.264 0.158 172 211 20.5 
1986 0.158 195 222 20.7 
1987 0.158 198 233 20.5 
1988 0.169 205 235 20.7 
1989 0.178 210 231 21. 1 
1990 0.294 0.180 202 242 21.4 
1991 0.307 0.175 218 
Notes and Sources: 
1. 豆豆豆 1987 ， pp. 4-7 and Z.GNYNL 1992 , p. 23. 
2. Estimate from SSB's urban household income and expenditure survey data given in .2000 China's People' s 
Consumptio!!, p.75 . 
3. Estimate from SSB's survey data in Z.GTJN1. 1986, p. 579 , 1987 , p. 694 , 1988 , p. 809, 1989, p. 729 , 1990, 
P. 297 , 1991 , p. 277 and 1992, p. 283. 
4&5: As a percentage of income and consumption in the urban household , see SSB 1984, pp . 167 & 169, ZGTJNJ , 
1992, p. 282 and .2000 China's Peoole's Consumotior}, p. 60. 
5. Ch泣， 1992b, p. 739. 
6. Share of non-agricultural population , Ch型， 1992b, p. 740. 
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urban areæ可 will increase the overa11 dispersion of income until the time 出at half the population lives 
in urban areru、. Beyond 血at further rural-urban migration w il1 decrease overall income disparity 
(perkins , 1988, p. 639). As the data in Table 1 show, the share of the 'real' urban population, 
namely the non-agricultura1 population, increased during the first phase of the reforms but it did so 
at a slow pace. Since 1985, however, its rate of increase has accelerated significantly. 
Piecing, together the evidence the overall income disparity appears to have remained relatively 
stable or even to have declined slightly in the first phase of the reforms due to the combination of a) 
the decline in the urban-rura1 income gap , b) the decline in urban income inequality, and c) 也e
relatively stable share of the rea1 urban population. But from 1985 on, with a widening urban-rura1 
income gap , an increase in income inequality wi由in both the urban and the rura1 sectors as well as 
a rise in the share of the urban population, the overa11 income disparity has been on the rise again. 
Sources of Income Inequality 
Per capita household income, y is defined as income currently earned' Y net of tJansfer 
payments，汀， divided by the number of household members , n. Hence, y = ( Y + tr) / n. Since 
income earned can be divided into wage income, W, which is related to employment and non-wage 
income, P , which is property or other type income unrelated to employment, per capita household 
income can be defined as Y ( W + P + tr) / n. Th is means 出at per capita household income 
differential or its variance depends largely on (1) the variance of per capita wage, property and 
transfer income among , households; (2) the relative share of wage , property income and transfer 
payment in total household income, and (3) the correlation among , households of these three types 
of per capita income. 
Urban Income Inequality 
Wage income is the single largest component of urban household income. In 1981 it 
accounted for more 出an 94 per cent of urban household disposable income. And even though its 
share has declined since then it still accounted for near1 y three quarters of disposable income in 1991. 
Hence most of the dispersion of urban household income can be attributed to the variation of their 
wage mcome. 
Since per capita household wage income is computed as the ratio of total wage (average wage, 
W, times the number of employed , l) to the number of household members , n, or, W/n = l/n x w, 
the variation of per capita wage income among households largely depends on the variation of the rate 
of employment, l/n, and average wage and their correlation among, urban households. 
The rate of employment of a household basically depends on demographic factors , especially 
on the number of children and their ages. Every child reduces the rate of employment in the family 
as it increases the number of dependents and reduces the mother's ability to be employed. 
However, this a1so depends on the employment opportunities for housewives and availability of care 
facilities for under-working age children. 
In the pre-reform period the variation in the households' rate of employment was significantly 
larger than that of their average wages. Hence, two thirds of the per capita income di在erentia1
between urban households in the past can be explained by their rate-of-employment differential. a監控
China's Peoole Consumotior1, 1988 , p. 68). Table 2 shows 出at in the first reform period the 
rate-of-employment di叮叮ential between the highest and lowest urban income group declined. Thus 
apart from the changing, demographic structure the reforms appear to have favoured the lower urban 
income group by opening more employment opportunities for them. During this period the average 
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jfable 2: Urban Households: Rate oC Employment and Average Income DiCCerentials 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
IL985 
IL98 
987 
988 
989 
990 
991 
cities2 
289 
287 
245 
240 
233 
Rate oC emolovment 
cities & urban vs 
towns2 rural3 
199 
194 
190 
186 
181 
176 
165 
122 
123 
114 
109 
100 
97 
95 
93 
93 
93 
95 
心的: 1. 1…per per…M 
Avera!!e income1 
cities2 cities & 
towns3 
134 
132 
151 
158 
243 159 
167 
166 
180 
193 
195 
193 
2. Ratio between highest and lowest income group in per cent 
3. Ratio between urban and rural household in per cent 
,Sources: 
urban vs 
rural3 
160 
150 
152 
156 
189 
205 
209 
219 
225 
217 
229 
豆豆豆， 1988b , pp. 15 , 27 , 38 , 51 , 64, 77-8; ZGTJNL 1986, p. 582 , 1987 , pp. 691 , 694 and 697; 1988 , p. 
809 , 1989, p. 727 , 1990, p. 297 , 1991 , p. 277 and 1992 , pp. 282-3 and 306. 
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wage di仔'erential among urban households has not declined but increased (see Table 3). S。由e
declining. , rate-of-employment differential was the major cause of the levelling of the urban income 
di仔'erenti a1 in this period. 
In the second phase of the reforms the trend of the declining , rate-of-employment differentia1 
among urban households continued (fable 2). Hence it cannot be held accountable for the rising 
urban income inequa1 ity in this period. Th is , therefore must be due entirely to the increase in average 
wage di旺'erential among urban households. Th is is confirmed by Table 3 which gives a detailed 
breakdown of urban household income by income category. While the data are not complete (data 
for 1986 and 1989-91 are not available) it shows 出at between 1981 and 1984 the average wage gap 
between the richest and the poorest urban households increased slight1 y . However, the gap was still 
lower 出an 出at of the rate of employment for urban households. Hence it has not been able to 
counterba1ance the income levelling, e仔'ects of the narrowing, rate of employment di叮叮entia1.
However, since 1985 the wage cap between the urban richest and the poorest households continued 
to rise and gradually caught up with the rate-of-employment gap among , urban households. Indeed, 
it became the major source of increasing urban household income disparity during this perioçl. 
Since average wage consists of basic pay and incentive pay , the average wage di旺'erential
depends largely on the relative share of these two types of wages and their relative dispersion. It is 
known 也at under the reforms the share of incentive pay so訂ed and reached almost half of total wage 
by the end of 1990. As evident from Table 3, the basic pay di仔erential has been very narrow and 
become relatively stable during the first phase of the reforms. It even declined slightly after the wage 
reform of 1985. Incentive pay differential , however, was much wider and soaring during the first 
phase of the reforms as well as since 1985. Hence the di旺'erences in incentive pay was a major 
source of average wage di旺'erential during the period under investigation. 
Property or non-wage income includes both income from individual enterprises and property 
income per se, i.e. any interest earned from bank accounts , plus share dividends etc.. Property 
income was negligible during the first period of the reforms. Although its share in tota1 urban 
disposable income has increased from 2 per cent in 1985 to about 3 per cent in 1991 (ZGTJNL 1992 , 
p. 282) it is not yet an important source of urban income inequality. 
Transfer payments in China consist of two types. Type 1 is provided by enterprises and is 
known as 'other incomes from household employment unit'. Type 11 is provided by the state in the 
form of price subsidies , child allowances , pensions and other welfare benefits. Social services (socia1 
benefit in kind) are not included in disposable income. Both types of transfer payments constitute an 
important element of urban household disposable income. During 1975-91 its share rose from 16 to 
25 per cent G..hi益， p. 282). 
The distribution of type 1 transfer payments between households was rather unequal as it 
largely depends on the financial situation of enterprises which employ the main breadearner of the 
household. Th is is confirmed in Table 3 which shows 出at the gap of transfer payment of type 1 per 
capita between the richest and the poorest urban households was significantly larger than their 
average wage gap. There is also a pronounced trend towards rising disparity in transfer payment 
distributed by enterprises. Hence it can be reasonably concluded that another major source of rising 
urban income inequa1 ity during , the second phase of the reforms was the unequal distribution of 
transfer payments by enterprises. Some of these were in fact disguised wage payments made in an 
a位empt to avoid payment of the bonus and wage adjustment tax. 
In the a位empt by the government to improve the material situation of low-income groups , 
families with children, and pensioners the share of type 11 transfer payments rose rapidly in recent 
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Table 3: City Households: Wage and Non-wage Income Differentials tI 
Wage2 Non-wage2 
Average Basic lncentive Transfer Transfer 
wage pay pay payment 13 payment lP 
1981 127 124 142 255 
1982 127 124 142 228 
1983 138 124 197 325 
1984 150 129 226 618 
1985 157 138 210 322 
1987 157 132 225 353 
1988 171 133 263 400 322 
Notes: 1. Ratio between highest and lovest income group in per cent. Figures for 1985-89 are not 
comparable with those of previous years because of the change in the number of income 
groups. 
2. Average per person employed. 
3. For an explanation see text. 
Sources: 豆豆豆， 1988b , p. 28 , 39 , 52 , 65 & 143; 1988a, p. 27; 1989 , p. 24 
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years. In 1985 it made up almost 10 per cent of urban household disposable income and by 1991 it 
reached 17.8 per cent, G坐丘， p. 282). 
Data on the distribution of type 11 transfer payments by income groups are available only for 
1988. These show 也at 也e cap between the richest and poorest urban households for this type of 
transfer payment was about 3.22 to 1 in 1988 , which was much larger than that of the average wage 
(1.71 to 1). Hence the e前'ect of this type of transfer payment on income distribution is more 
disequalizing than 出at of wages. However, its gap was smaller than that of all other sources of 
income (SSB , 1988 , pp. 2-3). Hence, in contrast to type 1 transfer payments the type 11 transfer 
payments have a narrowing effect on per capita urban household income di叮叮ential ， a finding which 
is also confirmed by Khan et al (p. 115). 
Rural Income Inequality 
Rural household net income is derived 台om two sources: agricultural and non-agricultural. 
Despite the rise of township and village enterprises 佇VEs) and other non-agricultural activities of 
rural households , earnings from agricultural activities still accounted for 72 per cent of rural 
household income in 1991 (ZGTJN1, 1992 , p. 307). Hence, most of the variation of rural household 
per capita net income can be explained by the variation of earning from agricultural activities. Unlike 
urban households , a significant proportion of rural household earning from agricultural production 
is implicit property returns or rent on land , the height of which depends on the land-man ratio (ld/n) 
and the average rent received , r, or Pln = ldln x r. Since the land-man ratio depends largely on the 
availability of cultivated areas in the region where farmers are located and average rent depends 
largely on the quality and location of these lands the level of individual rural household income from 
agricultural activities depends very much on spatial factors. 
Earnings from non-agricultural activities accounted for about 25 per cent of the total net 
income of rural households in 1991. Its largest single source of earnings from non-agricultural 
activities was wage income which made up 9 per cent in 199 1. Since wage income was derived 
mainly from employment in rural TVEs , rural household wage income differential depends largely 
on the degree of rural industrialization in the regions. 
China is a country of vast di前erences between provinces and regions in terms of agricultural 
productivity and rural industrialization. As a result rural per capita income varies a great deal 
between provinces. For example, per capita income of Shanghai peasants in 1985 was more 出an
three times that of those in the poorest province, Gansu (Table 4). By 1990, the income gap between 
the two had risen to a ratio of more than 4 to 1. The rising trend of the inter-provincial rural income 
inequality is also evident from the estimated population weighted coefficient of variation which rose 
from 0.7389 in 1985 to 0.75563 in 1990. 
There are several reasons why regional rural income disparity has increased under the reforms 
since 1978. One of the reasons is related to the distribution of property or implicit rental income. 
Prior to the reforms a part of the implicit rental income was siphoned 0旺 in the form of low fixed 
prices for agricultural products and redistributed it on an egalitarian basis favoring poorer regions by 
the government Another p訂t was retained by the collective for capital accumulation. Since the 
government applied pressure on the collectives in the more affluent regions to save a relatively higher 
proportion of their net output 出is also had an equalizing e前'ect on regional income distribution. 
However, wi出 the introduction of the household responsibility system (HRS) , the collapse of the 
commune system and the increase of agricultural purchase prices , as well as the decentralization of 
fiscal resources , a large part of the implicit rent is now returned to the peasants 巴hai 1985) and 
retained within the region of its origin. Thus the reforms have widened regional income differential. 
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Table 4: Regional Disparities in Per Capita Net Income of Chinese Pωsan的，
1985 and 1990 (in yuan) 
Provincesl Agricultural Per Capita Net Income 
Municipalities Population (1986) 1985 1990 
in million 的%
Nation 
Average 848.2 100.0 398 630 
East: 
Beiiing 3.9 0.5 775 1261 
Tianjin 3.7 0 .4 565 1069 
Shanghai 4.3 0.5 806 1665 
Liaoning 22.2 2.6 468 776 
Shandong 68.0 8.0 408 645 
Jiangsu 51.2 6.0 493 884 
Zhejiang 34.1 4.0 609 1045 
Fujian 22.9 2.7 397 765 
Guangdong 50.0 5.9 495 952 
Hebei 48 .4 5.7 385 592 
Central: 
Heilongj ian 19.7 2.3 398 671 
Jilin 14.6 1.7 414 717 
Henan 68.9 8.1 329 482 
Shanxi 21.0 2.5 358 560 
A吋lui 44.6 5.3 397 517 
Hubei 39.1 4.6 421 602 
Hunan 48.9 5.8 395 546 
Jiangxi 28.7 3.4 377 580 
Sichuan 88.3 10 .4 315 505 
Shaanxi 25.0 3.0 295 460 
Wes t: 
Guangxi 34.6 4.1 303 500 
Ningxia 3.3 0 .4 321 534 
X泣ang 1. 8 0.2 353 437 
Xingjiang 9.3 1. 1 394 623 
Neimenggu 14 .4 1.7 360 607 
Yunan 30.5 3.6 338 490 
Guizhou 26 .4 3.1 288 435 
Gansu 17.5 2.1 255 399 
Qinghai 2.9 0.3 343 514 
Coefficient of variation, population weighted: 
0.7389 0.7556 
Source: Ch泣， 1992b , p. 738 
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Another important reason for it is the unequal distributive effect of the state agricultural 
purchase price policy. Under the two-track agricultura1 procurement system peasants were obliged 
to sell a portion of their output to the state at a state-fixed contract price and were free to sell the 
remainder on the market at market prices. Since the market price tends to be higher than the contract 
price the two-track system caused 出e e前'ective price received by peasants to vary with the size of 
their output. The average purchase price received by peas徊的 in rich regions , where output is high, 
is relatively higher 出扭曲at in poor regions , where most of the output is either self-consumed or sold 
to the state at the low contract price leaving only a margina1 amount for sale at higher market prices. 
Yet another disequalizing, factor was the government policy of preferential development of 
the relatively prosperous Eastern seaboard provinces. This 訂閱， in contrast to the inner regions , not 
only received the lion share of state investments but was a1so dec1ared an open 訂ea where foreign 
trade and investment restrictions were lifted and spec凶 incentives were 0叮叮ed to attract overseas 
investment 但且鐘， 1992). The increased inflow of state and foreign investments into this region , 
出ough concentrating mainly in cities, have benefited rural industries and the surrounding rura1 areas 
by expanding their market CKnhrht & Son立， 1993 , p. 202). 
Finally, the lifting , of the barriers to the movement of the factors of production across regions 
should be expected to have an equalizing, e旺'ect on regional income distribution as capital inflow into 
poorer regions and the movement of labor away from them should improve their economic situation 
仔isdell ， 1992, p. 86). Unfortunately , so far the rate of migration in rural areas remains relatively 
low. Between 1985 and 1990 only 0.24 per cent of the 1990 rural population acred 5 and above 
moved from one county to another G.bi丘， p. 210). On the other hand , the lifting of the barrier to 
opportu,nity for regions to pursue their own comparative advantage and fully exploit their 
own-potential ei出er in agricultural or rural industry enabled rich regions to crow faster and , hence, 
contributed to increased dispersion of rural income among regions. 
Rural - Urban Income Differential 
If transfer payments and receipts are disregarded the urban-rural per capita household income 
gap is simply the ratio of per capita urban household wage income (number of urban wage earners , 
仙， times their average wage, w, divided by the number of urban household members , nu , or lu/nu 
x w) to 出at of rural household net income (number of rural income earners , lr, times their average 
wage and property income, yr, divided by the number of rura1 household members , nr or lr/nr x yr. 
甘lÏs ratio therefore critically depends on (a) the rate-of-employment gap , namely lu/nu / lr/nr, and 
(b) the average earning gap , wlyr, between urban and rural households . 
An analysis of the trend of these two determinants of 出e urban-rural income gap is given in 
Table 2. It shows that the decreased urban-rural income disparity during , the first phase of the 
reforms (1981-4) was mainly attributable to the narrowing, of both the rate-of-employment gap and 
the average earning gap. The increased employment opportunities available to rural households as 
a result of the introduction of HRS , the lifting of restrictions on rural households in engaging in 
non-agricultural activities undoubtedly contributed significantly to the narrowing , of the urban-rura1 
rate-of-employment and the income gap during this period. 
During the second phase of the reforms the urban-rural rate-of-employment gap continued to 
narrow. However, its pace slowed down. At the same time, after an initi a1 dec1 ine, the average 
earning gap between the two household groups increased significantly. For while it was merely 1.56 
to 1 in 1984 it widened to 2.29 to 1 in 199 1. Th is apparently was the main source of widening 
urban-rural income gap in the second period of the reforms. 
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Given the relative rate of employment in urban and rural households and the basic wage in 
urban households , the urban-rural average earning, gap depends critically on (1) the workers' share 
in firm profits and (2) on the relative price of agricultural and industrial products or the agricultural 
terms of trade, and (3) on the input-output relation or productivity in both the agricultural and 
industrial sectors. 3 An improvement in the agricultural terms of trade and productivity will reduce 
the urban-rural average earning gap whereas its worsening will increase it. 
Table 5 shows 也at during the first period of the reforms the agricultural purchase price crew 
much faster than industrial prices. Th is , coupled with the increase in agricultural productivity under 
出e HRS , was one of the main sources of the narrowing, of the urban-rural average earning gap in 
the period. In the second period of the reforms the growth of industrial prices caught up with that 
of agricultural products and overtook it in 1988 resulting in the fall of agricultural relative prices. 
Th is , together with the slowdown of agricultural productivity growth (Çh泣， 1992a) was one of the 
factors behind the rising , urban-rural average earning gap. Another contributing, factor was the rising 
share of enterprise and workers in firm profits under the management contract responsibility system 
introduced in the second phase of the reforms 已且泣， 1991). 
Other As pects of Economic Inequity 
Another form of inequality lies in the unequal access to social services or social benefits in 
kind. Social services such as health-care, education and cultural facilities provided by the state are 
not inc1uded in the disposable income and , therefore , do not have an impact on household income 
differential. However, access to these services by the di在'erent social strata influences overall real 
income inequity. More importantly it crucially affects stratification, defined as the transmission of 
inequalities over time and from generation to generation. 
The reduction in stratification requires an equitable distribution of social conditions'. Access 
to , and the quality of, education and health services in China, however , vary considerable from region 
to region and between urban and rural areas. The distribution of these services prior to 出e be desired 
e缸益 1989). However , the decentralization of fiscal resources under the reforms noticeably 
increased local differences because of di在'ering ， local financial capabilities 但立起血， 1988，且包盔，
1989, HendersoI} , 1990). 
With reg訂d to medical care, the available evidence indicates 出at local as well as urban-rural 
inequality to access has risen under the reforms. Measured in terms of the number of hospital beds 
per 1000 population Table 6), the urban-rural medical care gap first dec1 ined despite the demise of 
the commune from 3.15 to 1 in 1975 to 2 .44 to 1 in 1985. However, this improvement was more 
apparent than real because the change occurred not as a result of the building , of more hospital beds 
in the rural areas but rather as a consequence of greater emigration from rural areas due to 出e lifting 
of migration restrictions. In the second phase of the reforms the growth of the number of hospital 
beds in urban areas was twice as fast as that in rural ones which actually stagnated. As a result, the 
urban-rural medical gap soared again to 3.27 to 1 in 1991. 
Other measurements of urban-rural medical care gap follow more or less the same trend. For 
example, the gap in the provision of medical doctors per 1000 population first dec1 ined but then rose 
again in the second period of the reforms. 
Unequal access to medical care both within urban as well as within rural areas has also 
increased. In rural areas the demise of the communes withdrew one important base of support for 
rural nutrition and preventive health programs (perki肘， 1988 , p. 640). Between 1975 and 1986 出e
number of barefoot doctors declined significantly. Since 1986 the total number of village health 
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Table 5: Index of Agricultural Purchase and Industrial Retail Prices, 1978-1990 
A verage farm 
procurement 
price1 
in rural areas 
(1) 
Retail price of 
industrial 
products 
',
a o e c --•••••• 
a 
rapr e
仙的
VEIC U
旭
u
akd I九
ro
bdgr Eap 
(2) (3) = (1) I (2) 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
100.0 
122.2 
130.8 
138.6 
141.6 
147.8 
153.7 
166.9 
177.6 
198.9 
244.7 
28 1.4 
274.1 
100.0 
100.0 
100.9 
101.9 
103.6 
104.6 
107.8 
11 1.3 
114.9 
120.4 
138.7 
164.7 
172.2 
100.0 
122.2 
129.7 
136.0 
136.7 
141.3 
142.6 
150.0 
154.6 
165.2 
176 .4 
170.9 
159.2 
Annual average growth: 
1978-1984 7 .4 
1984-1990 10.1 
1.2 
8.1 
6.1 
1. 1 
Source: ZGTJNL 1991 , p. 230 
Notel: All figures refer to state purchase prices only. 1978-84 figures include quota, above quota 
and negotiated prices , and 1985-90 figures include contract, proportion and negotiated 
pnces. 
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personnel further declined (ZGTJNL 1991 , p, 778). 
The village collectives which succeeded the former production brigades and teams continue 
to fund medical care and education services and finance them by collecting dues from peasants as 
well as their share in profits of rural industrial enterprises (Chai , forthcoming). 1n the least 
industrial泣ed regions , however, resources from collective dues were only sufficient to finance public 
utilities and pay for general administrative expenses. Only in the more industrialized regions , where 
collectives own a significant number of rural industrial enterprises , are collectives able to obtain 
sufficient revenues to finance social services in kind. Hence, access to medical care for peasants 
varies widely across regions. 1n some areas it is excellent in quality and free of charge, in others it 
may be accessible 0叫y by payment of a fee and be poor in quality. 
Within the urban sector unequal access to medical care is also evident from the distinction 
between tenured and contract workers. The former receive 臼11 medical coverage whereas the 
growing number of 出e la前er do not m位盔， 1989). 
With respect to education the reforms brought some improvement in respect to access to 
primary education. However , they also result叫 in a more bifurcated system and greater access 
inequalities. The education system is divided into a 'mass' sector for 'slow' children , and a small 
elite sector which is accessible only to the most qualified students. Not only has the gap between the 
two sectors widened 惶逃鈕， 1990, p. 299) but access to higher education has become more difficult 
as wel l. Enrolment in higher education from senior high school on has generally declined during the 
reform period. Between 1980 and 1987 more than 30 million youths dropped out from primary and 
secondary schools and the drop-out rate continued to soar in 1988-89 cz.坦峙 ， 1992 , p. 145). 
The unequal access to education between country and town is most evident from the declining 
share of rural children enrolled in lower and upper middle schools (Table 7). Since the completion 
of middle school is a prerequisite for entering tertiary institutions 出 is impl ies that their share in 
tertiary level studies also declined. 
Within the rural sector access to education also varies widely from region to region. Since 
the government has relinquished its financial responsibility for education to the village government 
and the collectives 位位盔， 1989 , p.14) accessibility to education services depends on the financial 
strength of the village. Children in villages with strong, collective economies and highly developed 
rural industrial enterprises need to pay only a nominal fee for relatively good educational facilities 
whereas those in less industrialized regions have to pay relatively higher fees for poorer services and 
facilities because of the lack of finance from other sources. 
Poverty 
Most of China's poor people are in rural areas. Th is section gives a general description of 
the situation of China's rural poor based on data from a survey of China's 23 poor counties carried 
out by 21 Universities in China in 1989 (DEDURC , 1992). Th is is followed by a preliminary 
assessment of the impact of the reforms on the poor and an exploration of their chances to improve 
their economic , social and political situation. 
A Profile of China's Rural Poor 
The picture of Chinese peasants in poor counties is a dismal one. Their per capita income 
averages onl y 365 yuan per ye征 which is barely enough to cover their consumption expenditures. 
While production costs are kept to a minimum 出ey push most of them into debts . Their dominant 
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Table 6: Number of Hospital ßeds and Doctors per 1000 Persons: Urban-rural Differential 
ßeds 
(1) 
1975 315 
1980 262 
1985 244 
1986 251 
1987 259 
1988 289 
1989 305 
1990 312 
1991 327 
Note: 1. Ratio bertween urban and rural areas in per cent. 
Source: ZGTJN1 1992 , pp. 77 and 789 
Doctors 
(2) 
342 
348 
325 
330 
342 
347 
350 
348 
360 
Table 7: Percentage of Students in City, Town and Village Schools 
1975 1980 1983 
Lower middle school 
City 18 12 15 
Town 10 10 13 
Village 72 78 71 
Upper middle school 
City 28 30 29 
Town 18 25 37 
Village 54 46 34 
Source: D缸盔， 1989, Table 3 and ZGTJ悶， 1992 , p. 729 
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1986 缸)91
15 16 
17 20 
68 64 
30 30 
44 48 
25 22 
source of income is from agriculture (61 %), followed by livestock, forestry , fishery and sidelines 
(17.6%). 
The average household size is 4.6 indicating not only that the ideal of the one-child nuc1ear 
family is not shared by the rural population but that peasants will increase the number of their 
children if they can a征。rd to do so (the poorest households average 4 .4, the better off ones 4.7). 
Their crude dwellings generally utilize unprocessed raw materials only. They are mud huts , 
wooden or stone structures with grass 曲的ched roofs etc. The average life expectancy of peasants 
seems relatively low, for those aged 65 ye訂s and over the average drops off sharply. 
Peasants in poor counties spend roughly half of their cross income on food (51.2 %) and only 
13 per cent on c1othes. Their unemployment rate averages 15.5 per cent and only 13 per cent have 
access to jobs. On the whole their income 仕om employment in factories & mines (4 %), construction 
and transport (2.2%) , services (1.7%) , or salary (5.3%) remains margina1. 
The survey divides China's rural poor into underdeveloped households (UDHs) , developing 
households (DGHS) and developed ones (DHs). The difference between them lies in being, caught 
in the poverty trap with or without hope. For the UDHS , who make up 54 per cent of the sample 
and represent the bulk of peasants in the poor counties , accumulate an annual debt of 50 per cent of 
their gross income. The DGHS , which account for 29 per cent of the sample, make an annual debt 
to the value of 20 per cent of their gross income, and only 17 per cent of peasants , namely the DHs , 
have a marginal surplus equivalent to about 9 per cent of their gross income. However, there are 
considerable regional differences. 
The UDHs and DGHs , which together make up more than 80 per cent, have less income, 
education , land and other means of production and job chances (as well as being in poorer heal出).
The UGHs also spent 10 per cent more on food than the DGHs and DHs (53 % versus 43 %) and less 
on c10thes (3% difference). The DHs tend to spend more money on lodging (3.1 %, 4 .4% and 7.3% 
respectively) as well as on weddings & funerals (1 0.8%) , gifts (9.3%)，如el and transport. 
As discussed previously , there is inequality of access to social services between urban and 
rural areas. Th is is aggravated by intra-rural stratification. For example, measured in terms of the 
percentage share of sick children in total child population the state of health of children aged 0-14 of 
the UDHs with 5.5 per cent is worse than that of DGHs and DHs with 3.2 per cent. The intra-rural 
health gap widens with age. The percentage of the sick in the 15-64 age group for UDHs with 13.9 
per cent is more than double that of DHs with 5.3 per cent and the picture is similar for the 65 plus 
age group. These di在'erences occur inspite of the fact that the UDHs spend nearly 9 per cent of their 
total consumption expenditure on medical care while DGHs and DHs spend only between 6 and 7 per 
cent. 
Causes of Poverty & Chances for Improvement 
Only about 20 per cent of peasants in China's poor counties seem to be able to plan, organ泣e
and influence their environment to some extent. The rest seem to be helpless. They have no chance 
of escaping the poverty trap simply because 出ey lack even basic means of production. While 
peasants own an average of 6.6 且且 of land 出ey seem to work it with their bare hands for the 
possession of plows (0.6 per cent) is as rare as 伽t of tools , pumps (tog的er 0.5 per cent ) and carts 
(0.3 per cent). Only about 1 per cent own a draught animal of any kind , the same is true for pigs , 
sheep and other animals. 
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Not surprisingly, the lack of capital is seen by peasants as the single most important re訟on
for their inability to improve their lot It was mentioned by 87 per cent in response to the question, 
which factors kept them from getting richer. Th is was followed by lack of technology (34 per cent) 
and only then by a lack of land (21 per cent ). Environmental restrictions are mentioned by another 
20 per cent. The lack of labor and transport seem to matter little as yet for the still largely 
self-su叮icient poor. 
Correct1y or not, the lack of education seems to China's rural poor one of the le品t important 
factors behind their lack of economic improvement. On average it was mentioned only by 4.3 per 
cent of peasants , and in Jiangxi province it was even seen as less important 出an the lack of 
connectlOns. 
There are hardly any prospects for China's rural poor to improve their inter-generational 
stratification. While 血ey generally tηto send their children to school every 10th child in rural areas 
is missing out on education altogether. Of those children who do not attend school 36 per cent do 
so for economic reasons. However, while better-off peasants keep their children at home because of 
economic hardship as often as because of labor shortage, the poorer children mostly miss out because 
of economic hardship. The latter tends to reinforce discrimination against girls who are three times 
as likely to be left at home than boys for this reason. On the other hand , boys only are kept out of 
school when there is shortage of labor. 
1n summ缸y ， for the rural population in China's poorer provinces the reforms have increased 
social di旺'erentiation to the extent of creating intra-rural cleavages between the bottom 80 per cent 
and the top 20 per cent of peasants in poor counties. Only the DHs are able to improve their 
economic situation marginal旬， which they do more by way of more intensive agriculture than by 
recourse to more sideline production. Thus the impact of reforms for the poor has led to some 
structural differentiation but not yet to specialization. The bottom 80 per cent are neither provided 
with adequate welfare nor with chances to improve their lot in the short-or long-run. Therefore, on 
the whole peasants are left as impotent in changing, their destiny as 出ey have been 扭曲e past. 
Summary and Outlook 
1n contrast to expectations by neo-liberals , the reforms in China over the last 14 years have 
not decreased but increased inequalities. However, the trends are complex: overall income inequality 
has remained relatively stable or even declined slightly during, the first phase of the reforms from 
1978-84. But in the second phase from 1985 upto the present the trend towards greater inequality 
is unmistakable. Trends in the other aspects of inequality, such as access to medical care and 
education, seem to follow the same pa討ern.
While the distributive impacts of market-oriented reforms cannot be unambiguously 
determined in thω句， the Chinese experience suggests that they contribute to an initial improvement 
followed by a dec1 ine in equality of income distribution. The initial improvement was mainly due 
to the dec1 ining , urban income inequality and the narrowing, of the urban-rural income gap. The 
former was due to the reduction of the rate-of-employment gap between the richest and the poorest 
urban households. The latter in turn was caused by the reduced differentials of both the rate of 
employment and average earnings between urban and rural households. 
As predicted by the barrier approach , the lifting of the barriers to employment in individual 
enterprise activities under the reforms opened up relatively more employment opportunities for the 
urban poor and , hence, reduced the gap in the rate of employment among , urban households. 
Simi.larly , the lifting of the restrictions for farmers to engage in non-agricu1tural activities and in 
18 
rural-urban migration has improved the rate of employment for peasant households relative to urban 
ones. 
The initia1 decline in the urban-rural earning gap can in p紅t be attributed to the 
decentralization of property rights under the HRS and the resu1ting, increase in farm productivity. 
However, it was also due to the policy of increasing, the state's agricultura1 purchase price in 出at
period. 
The rise of income inequa1 ity since 1985 was triggered by an increase in intra-sector 
inequa1 ity in both the urban and rural sectors as well as the widening urban-rural income gap 
accompanied by a rising share of the urban in tota1 population. Again, the market-oriented reforms 
played a significant role in increasing, inequality during this period. However, state policies 
reinforced the tendency towards growing inequ a1 ity rather than ameliorating it. 
The rise of urban inequa1 ity during this period was mainly due to growing wage differences , 
especially in incentive pay , for urban workers. The differential in incentive pay can in p征t be 
attributed to the market-oriented reforms as these create greater differences in reward in order to 
generate achievement motivation._ However , they were partly a1so caused by state policy , especially 
since the state was reluctant to modify prope口y relations of and to introduce capital charge for 
state-owned enterprises. Thus workers' pay contained an element of quasi rent and depended largely 
on enterprise profit. Enterprises with better access to state capital were able to acquire a quasi rent 
which was then distributed to workers as wages , and hence , led to the growing , inter-firm wage 
di叮erenti a1 s.
Another important source of the rising , urban income inequality since 1985 was the growing , 
differential in transfer payments funded by enterprises. Their distribution is rather unequal as it 
depends largely on the financial strength and profitability of 出e individu a1 enterprise. Since these 
payments and their structure are a legacy of 出e past, the inequality in income generated by it can only 
be attributed to the state policy ra出訂出an to the impact of the reforms. 
The rising rural income disparity was largely accounted for by the growing inter-regional 
rural income differential , most of which was due to the impact of market-oriented reforms. The 
de-facto privatization of farm land and the collapse of the commune distributive system a110wed 
peasants to appropriate most of the implicit rent on land. Peasants in regions with better land 
endowments and better access to transport and markets were able to acquire a relatively higher rent 
than others. The lifting of barriers for regions to fully exploit their own comparative advantage either 
in agricultura1 or non-agricultura1 activities a1so favored rich regions over poor ones. However, a 
part of the rising regiona1 disparity in rural income was also due to the government's preferential 
development policy of the Eastern seaboard. 
Similarly , the widening urban-rural income gap was attributable to the combination of market 
factors and state policy. It reflects the growing urban-rura1 average earning gap which in turn mirrors 
the growing urban-rura1 worker productivity gap. However , the increased inequality was p訂tly a1 so 
due to the state policy of depressing state contract purchase prices for agricultura1 products below the 
market value in order to extract surplus for urban-industrial development from rural areas 也盟h ，
1993). Fina11y, the rising , share of the urban population in 出e tota1 population as a result of greater 
labor mobility under the reforms also played an important role in increasing , the urban-rural income 
differentia1. 
In the future the widening , of the earning di在erential is likely to continue and perhaps even 
to strengthen. For it must be expected that the share of the urban population is likely to keep on 
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rising , a factor which alone will contribute to greater overall income inequality. Moreover, the 
market reforms are expected to continue to generate productivity and hence contribute to greater 
earning di叮叮entials between urban and rural workers. Th is trend is going, to be exacerbated by the 
state's policy of controlling the agricultural terms of trade which is most likely to continue for the 
sake of promoting urban industrial development wi也 the help of rural surplus. The growing regional 
income disparities will also generate greater income inequality. However，也is factor is likel y to be 
weakened by the greater regional mobility of labor and capital. Finally, the current urban pay 
di叮叮ential is considered too narrow by the government. The Gini coefficient of urban income 
distribution barely reached 0.2 in recent ye缸s ， which according to the classification of SSB , is rated 
as "extremely egalit紅ian" (Zhang & Lin, 1991 , p. 53). Hence an enlargement of 出is di在'erential for 
出e pu叩ose of promoting, e在iciency and incentive is expected in the future. 
However, the prospect of inequality in China does not have to be quite as bleak as described 
above because the distribution of earnings between recipients is not necessarily identical with 也at of 
household income. Theoretically the latter can be made to . di叮叮 from the former in order to 
reconcile the conflict between efficiency and equity 位組垃泣， 1980). 
To reduce the extent of inequality generated by market-induced earning differential the state 
could , first of all , reform the fundic , of the welfare system. Since welfare provisions and services 
are presently enterprise and local collective funded 血ey exacerbate inequalities , wi出 the most 
prosperous collectives and enterprises able to provide the more and better quality facilities at the least 
costs to clients. Hence to arrest the rising trend of inequality social services need to be 臼nded by 
the state and distributed according to need. 
Secondly , in order to prevent both 自己 enterprise and farms with access to better capital and 
land from reaping excessive rental income, rental charges on both capital and land should be 
introduced. Another factor which might alleviate the growing , earning inequality is the lifting of the 
barrier to movement of production factors across regions. So far this has not had much impact 
because interregional mobility of both labor and capital in China is still constrained. Hence the 
development of a 臼ll-fledged capita1 and labor market should help to ameliorate inequality in China. 
Finally , as in capitalist society , a comprehensive progressive income tax could a1so make a 
considerable contribution to the narrowing of the household income differential by decreasing, their 
earning di旺'erentia1.
The continuing accumulation of the debt burden by most poor peasants and the rising 
stratification can lead to political group consciousness. Th is may generate considerable politica1 
forces especia11y if the reforms continue to fail to provide adequate mechanisms for integration and 
stability. The unmet basic needs of peasants and the uncertainty generated by the reforms are likely 
to fuel unrealistic demands and possibly political unrest on the part of China's rural poor. 
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Notes: 
1. Var (ì) = Var 仍 + Var 仆的 + 2Coν伊'的 where Y is personal , P property and W wage 
income and var, variance and cov, co-v訂iance .
2. China's official per capita consumption data cover both private and public consumption and 
are therefore more comprehensive in coverage of income in kind than the household income 
survey data. 
3. The urban-rural average earning gap is a ratio of average wage (basic, Ws, plus incentive 
pay，明的 of urban income earners , lu , to the average net income of rural earners , lr. If rural 
earning from non-agricultural activities and any fixed cost of agricultural production are 
disregarded and if it is further assumed that all agricultural inputs are purchased from the 
industrial sector, the average net income of rural earners is equal to total sales of agriçultural 
products , EPa Qa less total purchase of agricultural inputs EPi Qi divided by the number of 
rural earners or (EPa Qa - EPi Qi) / Lr. Hence the urban-rural average earning di叮叮ential
lS 
(ws + Wb) / (EPa Qa - ~Pi Qi) /lr 
If it is assumed that all inputs of the firm are purchased from the agricultural sector and if 
any fixed cost are disregarded , then , because incentive pay of workers is linked to enterprise 
profit, wb is equal to a (EPi Qi - ~Pa Qa) /lu where a is the workers' share in the firm's 
profit. By simplifying and rearranging , the urban-rural average earning gap can be shown 
to be 
1/ (EPa Qa - ~Pi Qi) ρr Ws + a.lr / lu (EPi Qi - ~Pa Qa)J 
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